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NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES FROM 1790 TO 1955. By Fred Rodell. New York: Random House.
1955. Pp. xii, 338. $5.
Students of constitutional law and of government realize the importance
of studies of the Supreme Court as an institution, and of individual justices
who make up that institution, as an aid to the understanding of the functioning of the judicial branch of our government. The Court, in its interpretation and application of the provisions of our Constitution, determines,
possibly more effectively than either the legislature or the executive, the
kind of government we have and are destined to have in the future. It
can hardly be over-emphasized that what these nine men do to our present
and our future largely depends upon the background, environment and
experience of the individual justices. Therefore a political history-perhaps better still, a political, economic and social history-of the United
States Supreme Court is something that every serious student of government
and of the Constitution awaits with great anticipation, and, because the
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present volume seems to have done little to fill the need, the next announcement of such a study will be awaited with equal anticipation. Perhaps
this inadequacy would necessarily be true of any volume of such small
proportions addressed to so large an undertaking, but this book is criticized
principally for its excesses of bad taste in expression and its near personal
slanders which seem to serve no other purpose than to relieve some apparently extreme personal feelings of the author.
Probably no careful student of the work of the Supreme Court, or even
of public affairs in general, is likely to disagree wholly with the major
premise on which the book proceeds, or the early basic assertions suggested
by the title of Chapter One (characterizing the Court as "Powerful, Irresponsible, and Human"), that an understanding of the court's work
requires a consideration of the political, social and economic background
and outlook of the individual justices. One can also embrace the conviction implied in the quotation from Abraham Lincoln that, "Our judges
are as honest as other men and not more so. They have, with others, the
same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. . . .
Their power is the more dangerous as they are in offic-e for life, and not
responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control," without
being willing to accept the assertion of complete irresponsibility and complete subservi_ence to partisan political advantage so vigorously asserted by
the author. It can be true that there are decisions that fully justify Justice
Stone's admonition in dissent in the Butler case that "the only check upon
our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint," and Justice
Holmes' earlier castigation of a majority in a state tax case when he said,
"As the decisions now stand I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights [constitutional rights of the states] if they happen
to strike a majority 'of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot
believe that the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to give us carte
blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions." Yet
it does not necessarily follow that a popular or semipopular treatise on the
Supreme Court can justifiably paint the whole picture so dark as is here
presented without running the risk of doing much more harm than good.
Any volume directed to the functioning of a governmental agency,
as this volume is, presumably is intended to add to the store of information
and understanding of its readers, and since Mr. Rodell appears to disclaim
(in fact, banish the thought) any purpose to write for lawyers, the popular
reader must have be-en expected to be the richer, intellectually, informationally and understandingly, for having taken advantage of the opportunity
thus presented to him. The suggestion that the general reader can grasp
the full significance of the book's contents, or even have a greater appreciation of the tasks being devolved upon the members of the Supreme Court,
could hardly have been taken seriously by the author, who appears to
assume that no constitutional problems, as such, exist or are grappled with
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by the Court or its members, but rather that all decisions are dictated by
some ad hoc partisan political expediency.
Long before the time of Rodell it was well known that John Marshall
conceived of himself as more than a judge, something of a judicial statesman shaping the destinies of the new national government, giving effect
to political considerations, in the sense that the political scientist uses that
term, without divorcing himself from the partisan political considerations
that are the stock in trade of the practical politician. Even if a judge made
conscious effort to divorce his thinking from such influences, it would be
as impossible as it would be undesirable, certainly as to the former and
partly as to the latter. Since both types of political considerations are
affected or controlled by background, environment, and social and economic
experience, which inevitably dominate a man's point of view and his thinking on and off the Court, the characterization of the Court as a political
institution really introduces no new conception, yet the coarseness of its
emphasis in the pages of this book does perhaps achieve the status of
novelty.
That presidents throughout our history from Washington to Eisenhower
have not been blind to political considerations, not only in the larger sense
but in the partisan sense, in making appointments to the bench does not
necessarily mean the Court is properly considered a solely partisan political
institution. Certainly politics in the broader political science sense is a
not improper concern of the Court and each of its members. That partisan politics has been the sole or the dominating influence in the minds of
most Supreme Court justices throughout our history is not likely to be
generally accepted as a correct appraisal, even if it has been true in too many
cases.
The author's castigation in Chapter Two of the Court's refusal to give
advisory opinions, in what becomes his typical disregard of and complete
refusal to recognize the possibility that there may be justifying considerations for Supreme Court decisions with which he disagrees, serves to set
the stage for his complete and continuous intimation, if not assertion, that
he alone is wise enough to have directed proper decisions, and that the
determinations made by the Court have either been due to the laziness of
the justices or have been dictated by political considerations, nearly always
partisan, the great majority of which have been almost equally unfortunate,
unwise, unjust and destructive of the common good, and primarily directed
to something like a conspiracy to assert and maintain an autocratic power
over the legislative and executive branches of the government. Nowhere
does the author recognize that there may be considerations weighing against
the practice of the justices functioning as the active advisers of the executive and the legislature as he considers desirable.
Again, to say that the "clear and present danger test" is a perversion of
the First Amendment, which says "Congress shall make no law . . .,"
hardly serves to clarify the problems both groups on the Court have always
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recognized as present in the application of our constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. It is, no doubt, easy to apply
if we accept the literal wording of the amendment-Congress shall make
no law-as precluding any possible limitations or qualifications, regardless
of the extreme nature of the incitement involved or the extent of the danger
to which it gives rise. That, indeed, avoids all problems by pronouncing
that there can be none, constitution-wise. Without entirely denying the
possible validity of this position as to the First Amendment, it seems that
it would have been appropriate to apprise the reader of the fact that
serious problems do exist in such cases, as evidenced, for example, by recent
decisions circumscribing and whittling away the doctrine of freedom of
speech applied in the Thornhill case, moving in the direction of complete
destruction of that important liberty, at least in one phase of its application,
if, in fact, that point has not already been reached. A consideration of the
factors that must weigh in the minds of the justices, liberal or conservative,
in dealing with such a problem, together with some evaluation thereof,
might produce a· more important contribution, even though obviously
fraught with infinitely more difficulty, little of which Mr. Rodell finds in
the disposition of any constitutional problems-if he is willing to admit
that there are or can be any such problems.
Belaboring the Court for its refusal to step in before a case comes to
it in regular course may demonstrate either the author's complete absence
of understanding of the established place of the judiciary generally in the
Anglo-American governmental system, or, what is more likely, when coupled
with his bad taste in his personal references to individual justices, a quest
for some public attention that may not otherwise be forthcoming. To refer
to one justice as "frogmouthed" or to another as "sloppy, snuff-sniffing,
slight of build and slight of mentality," to mention only two instances of
extreme bad taste, certainly contributes nothing to scholarly achievement
and seems intended only to give publicity to the fact that the author has
reached such heights that he, alone perhaps, can print the unpleasant truth.
Had this book come a quarter of a century earlier 'Yhen the synthetic
halo about the Court had not been so effectively pierced by other writers,
it might have served a useful purpose, notwithstanding its bad taste and
the fact of being greatly overdrawn. With the need for a political, economic
and social history of the Supreme Court being so great as many of us feel
it is, it is indeed unfortunate that anyone with sufficient apparent familiarity
with the work of the Court-even if somewhat superficial-to catalog with
recognizable accuracy so many landmark decisions, should not be able to
turn his talents to a more constructive purpose.
Nine Men is in many ways a very peculiar book and that which primarily
characterizes the first two chapters is either not applicable to the rest of
it, or is so in a very much lesser degree. That the author is capable of
writing effectively, understandingly and revealingly about the Court is
amply _demonstrated by his chapter on John Marshall. His appraisals of
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Justices Johnson and Story in the same chapter are also worthy of a book
unmarred by the major sins already enumerated.
The significant transition from Marshall to Taney and from almost
sole concern for the protection of property interests to the direction of
judicial power for the protection of human rights and human liberty, or
as the author puts it, the rights of people, is at least fairly implied if not
effectively expressed in the parting shots of the same useful chapter. And
in his next chapter, Four, more directly dealing with Taney's regime, he
correctly stresses this basic difference rather than the surface indications of
shifting from an emphasis on a strong central government to an emphasis
on state rights. Even today some people seem to see in the differing philosophies of the two major political parties only a cleavage between state
rights and centralization of power, in reverse, it is true, as between Democrat and Republican, as their most important manifestation, without taking
note of the fact that the fundamental difference is still the protection of
property rights versus the protection of human rights.
That basic shift in Supreme Court emphasis and direction, with the
change from Marshall to Taney, as a highly significant turning point in
our history, is properly recognized and emphasized. To say this, however, is
not to deny the existence of substance in the author's emphasis upon Taney's
concern for the property interest of the landowner and the slave owner,
which, most noticeably at least in his later years, dictated decisions ·hardly
consistent with what appeared to be his initial liberal approach. The fact
that many of these decisions resulted, at least in large part, from concern
for a different type of property interest than had received the protecting
care of the Marshall Court does not altogether negative the liberalizing
effect as compared with the prevailing decisions of the Marshall era. Had
Taney's and the Court's developing tendency to exhibit concern for the
institution of slavery, and, as many assert, including the author, the protection of slave-owning property, not eventuated in the disastrous Dred
Scott decision, Taney's position as a liberal justice would have been much
more secure.
The story of the eclipse of the Supreme Court after Dred Scott, during
the Civil War and subsequent thereto, and of the slow regaining of a position of power, during which period the Court had few outstanding personalities among the justices, and no such dominating character as Marshall or
Taney at the helm, is told reasonably effectively, if wholly unspectacularly.
As we can count on the fingers of one hand the really great presidents this
nation has had and may well agree with the comments of Lord Bryce on
the mediocrity of the occupants of the presidency, it should not be surprising that many men appointed to the Supreme Court never rise above their
level of mediocrity. The appointment of a lame duck politician to the
Court can hardly be expected to convert him into a legal giant or an all
wise judicial statesman. And, after all, a Holmes, a Brandeis or a Cardozo,
or even a Hughes, a Miller or a Harlan-the first Harlan, that is-is not
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always readily available. The author's revelation to his popular readers
of the difficulty on the part of a president in predicting with accuracy
what an appointee to the Court may do, as illustrated by Theodore
Roosevelt's appointment of Holmes and his performance in the Northern
Securities case, and Lincoln's appointment of Chase and his relation to
the Legal Tender Cases, serves a useful and wholesome purpose, as does
also his portrayal of the pressures upon a reluctant president that can
bring about the appointment of a Cardozo.
The author's treatment of the Slaughterhouse Cases as the decision of
the Court which temporarily stemmed the rising tide of due process-not
yet fully asserted in its own name-and which became the vehicle for the
Supreme Court's passing upon the merits of legislation, is an interesting and
stimulating portrayal for those who already know the story, but the uninitiated are likely to find it scarcely revealing.
It hardly adds to the scholarship of the author's product, or makes a
contribution to public information, to characterize as "judicial vandalism"
the Court's determination that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which says only that "no state shall" do so and so, "is applicable only to
action by the state, or its officers or agents, and not to the acts of private
individuals.
The Court's resurgence to a position of unprecedented primacy with
its successful assertion of due process (originally intended and for nearly
a century used only as a protection or guarantee of a fair trial as was its
English counterpart) as authority for a veto based upon a consideration of
the merits or reasonableness of any legislation, state or federal, is appropriately emphasized.
The author's portrayals of the Debs, the Knight and the Pollock cases
of 1895 in exemplification of the Court's new power are perhaps among the
best of his book, though in comparison with much else, the characterization of these three cases, particularly the last-among the most indefensible
of Supreme Court decisions-is marked by considerable restraint. Perhaps
the quotations from the dissents were regarded as sufficiently critical.
While there is passing reference to the Court embracing the doctrine of
"freedom of contract," as well as the Plessy v. Ferguson "separate but equal"
doctrine, the popular reader for whom the book purports to have been
written is likely to gain small conception of the meaning or significance
of either.
That the close of this era gave way to a new one most significantly
marked, if not dominated, by the intellectual leadership of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, is properly recognized. The author's carefully correct
characterization of Holmes as the political conservative (yet judicial and
intellectual liberal) that he clearly was, ranks among his best performances
in the volume. In his analysis of perhaps too few of Holmes' opinions,
including the frequent quotations, usually from his dissents, striking at
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the invalidation of tax and regulatory measures both state and federal,
on due process or state rights bases, and the justice's emphasis on the protection of the First Amendment for freedom of speech and freedom of the
press, the author, probably better than anywhere else, gives the popular
reader for whom he writes some worthwhile understanding of what the
Court was doing, and at the same time allows the uninitiated reader a
fleeting glimpse of the judicial greatness that was and is Holmes' alone.
In quoting from Justice Holmes his famous dissenting statement that,
"There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making. of social experiments that an important part of the community
desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states, even though
the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose
judgment I most respect," along with others of similar significance, the
author provides for any reader a basis for understanding something of the
nature of the judicial conflict that has for so long a time occupied the Court,
and at the same time furnishes an insight into the capacity of Justice Holmes,
as an economic and political conservative, to practice that all-important selfrestraint so pointedly emphasized some years later by Justice Stone in his
famous dissent in the AAA case.
At the same time and by the same materials the author best illustrates
his emphasis on judicial supremacy, which he asserts throughout, and his
major point of judicial irresponsibility, by showing how the Court stood
for years in the path of legislative progress as gauged by the temper and
purposes of the "political" branches of the government, and wielded the
axe of unconstitutionality to defeat governmental attempts, state and federal,
to cope with concentrations of economic power and protect the public
interest through measures that had the support of vast majorities of our
people, particularly under the leadership of such executives as "Wilson
and Roosevelt.
On the whole, Chapter Six, "Associate Justice Holmes, Dissenting,"
is a highly worthwhile account of the Court's larger performances during
the Holmes incumbency, without the marring pettiness applied to personalities in other parts of the volume, and is a useful contribution to the public
understanding of a highly significant episode in our Supreme Court's and
our nation's history. It does, however, demonstrate the unfortunate circumstance of trying to compress a major history within the confines of a
single small volume.
Chapter Seven, "The Court Collides with the New Deal," is well prefaced by brief but effective, and not unduly derogatory, thumb-nail sketches
of the so-called "Four Horsemen," Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland
and Butler, giving the reader, popular or otherwise, a fair indication of
what to expect when New Deal measures reached the Court. The prior
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reminder of the conditions that brought on the New Deal legislation and
its widespread welcome, even from conservative business men temporarily
cowed by fear, usefully presents facts that the reader might otherwise fail
to bear in mind.
Likewise, the analysis of the Roberts-Hughes "swing" position, emphasizing that it was always the shifting of Roberts and not of Hughes that was
determinative in crucial cases, brings even to the well initiated a helpful
reminder of an important detail easy to lose sight of.
The brief but realistic sketches of Hughes, Brandeis and Stone, particularly the last two, being like Holmes distinctly within the author's favor,
serve as helpful and enjoyable reminders for those already familiar, and
do much to enable the general reader to understand and appreciate their
distinctly liberal performances as justices upon the High Court.
The many significant cases which first vetoed in a wholesale manner
New Deal and similar state legislation and later inconsistently sustained
such measures as Social Security and the Wagner Act, along with the
Supreme Court Reorganization Plan fight, are handled by the_ author in a
way to intrigue those already familiar and to give to the most general reader
a reasonably accurate picture of the historic developments of this history
making period. This, which is done without the bad taste personality
references of an earlier chapter, does much to counterbalance the "unadmirable" characteristics of the book.
That an all-liberal Court which next came on the scene might well
develop divisions; or even splinters, as Chapter Eight sets out, was not
particularly surprising, since the affirmative responsibility for control
and direction of necessity brought forth reactions on the part of the justices
different from those involved in the dissents to which their predecessors
were accustomed, but to give even a reasonably accurate portrayal of the
reasons therefor was no easy task.
If the analysis of the New Deal justices gives a fair picture of the men
making up the first and only all-liberal Supreme Court in our history, the
analysis of its decisions can be followed only with considerable difficulty
by those already familiar, and by the general reader, it would seem, not at
all. It should be said, however, that the nature of the cases and the great
numbers of slightly differing views expressed make clarity of explanation
not without great difficulty.
The fact that the author has little that is complimentary to say about
the Vinson Court, and finds much t? indicate a losing of ground in the
field. of civil liberties with which he manifests so much genuine concern,
hardly furnishes a basis ,for any serious adverse criticism. His finding of
some raY. of hope for better things to come from the Warren Court largely
rests in the category of unconfirmed speculation. No great quarrel can
be had with the assertion that men of lesser ability have been coming to the
Court with recent changes in personnel, and tl1at both qualitatively and
quantitatively much less work is being turned out than by the Hughes and

1956]

RECENT BooKS

1207

Stone Courts. It is with this Court that note is especially taken of the increased practice of denying certiorari in cases involving vital constitutional
issues, a practice that has sparked many another adverse comment.
On the whole the book is neither so bad as its early chapters promised
nor so good as it might have been with the omission of much that serves no
useful purpose and has no proper place in a volume not dedicated to the
task of degrading the Court in the popular mind or of destroying such
respect as it does enjoy.
The much needed political, social and economic history of the Supreme
Court of adequate proportions still cries out to be written.

Robert L. Howard,
Professor of Law,
University of Missouri

